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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-1333 
____________ 
 
FREDERICK W. SMITH, JR., 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
THE STATE OF DELAWARE; NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
SUPERIOR COURT, PRESIDING JUDGE 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-01340) 
District Judge: Richard G. Andrews 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 30, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 13, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Frederick W. Smith, Jr., appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint as frivolous.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the appeal as 
frivolous. 
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 Smith, a Delaware inmate, was convicted following a jury trial in the Delaware 
Superior Court of various sexual assault crimes in connection with an incident of 
domestic violence.  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 32 years at Level 5 
incarceration.  On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Smith contended that the trial 
court erred in “(i) admitting medical records that had been redacted by the prosecutor; (ii) 
refusing to admit a portion of [his] statement to the police; (iii) admitting prior ‘bad acts’ 
evidence; (iv) admitting the victim’s tape-recorded statement pursuant to 11 Del. Code § 
3507; and (v) denying [his] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at the conclusion of the 
State’s case.”  Smith v. Delaware, 669 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1995).  The Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed the criminal judgment.  Id. at 6-7 (out-of-court statement should not have 
been admitted pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3507, but error did not deprive defendant of fair 
trial because State had strong case even without that statement).    
 Smith’s attempts over the years to obtain collateral relief in both state and federal 
court have been unsuccessful.  For example, following the denial of his federal habeas 
corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, he appealed and, on December 22, 2004, we denied his 
request for a certificate of appealability, see C.A. No. 04-3156.  And, in 2009, he was 
enjoined in state court from filing any more challenges to his conviction and sentence 
without first seeking leave of court.  Smith v. Delaware, 2009 WL 2888258, at *2 (Del. 
Sept.10, 2009).  Furthermore, Smith has sued, unsuccessfully, Correct Care Solutions, the 
state prison medical provider, alleging various claims of medical negligence.  See Smith 
v. Correct Care Solutions, 2012 WL 2352985 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012).  
 At issue in this appeal, on October 24, 2014, Smith filed a civil rights action, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware against the 
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State of Delaware, the Delaware Attorney General, and the Presiding Judge of the New 
Castle County Superior Court.  In this purported civil rights action, Smith claimed in 
principal part that he was wrongly convicted based on the prosecution’s failure to correct 
the false testimony of the victim.  Smith also claimed that he was not getting adequate 
psychiatric care in the state prison, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that, 
because he suffers from schizophrenia, he should not be criminally incarcerated; rather, 
he should be civilly committed to the Delaware Psychiatric Center (“DPC”).  Smith 
sought unspecified declaratory relief and nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. 
 In an order entered on January 26, 2015, the District Court dismissed the action as 
frivolous pursuant to Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989), 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(i).  The Court held that, to the extent that 
Smith was challenging his conviction and sentence, his sole federal remedy is by way of 
habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and further held that Smith 
cannot recover money damages under § 1983 for wrongful incarceration unless he proves 
that his conviction has been reversed, expunged or invalidated, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 487 (1994).  The Court held that, to the extent that Smith’s action was a true 
civil rights action concerning the conditions of his confinement, the defendants were 
immune from suit.  The State of Delaware is immune pursuant to the Eleventh 
Amendment, see, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 
100-02 (1984); and judges and prosecutors are immune from suit, see Capogrosso v. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (judicial immunity); 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).  The District 
Court further held that any amendment to the complaint would be futile. 
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 Smith appeals.  Our Clerk granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and 
advised him that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He 
was invited to submit argument in support of his appeal.  Smith submitted a brief, which 
we will consider in the context of possible dismissal or summary action.  We note that 
Smith attached to his brief a copy of an unsuccessful grievance concerning his wish to 
serve the remainder of his sentence at DPC.  Smith also has moved for appointment of 
counsel. 
 We will dismiss the appeal as frivolous.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  An appellant may prosecute his appeal without prepayment of the fees, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(a)(1), but the in forma pauperis statute provides that the Court shall dismiss the 
appeal at any time if the Court determines that it is frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  An appeal is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or 
fact.  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.  The District Court correctly held that, to the extent that 
Smith was challenging his conviction and sentence by claiming that his conviction was 
based on perjured testimony, his sole federal remedy is by way of habeas corpus pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Preiser, 411 U.S. 475.  In addition, Heck, 512 U.S. 477, precludes § 
1983 claims like Smith’s whose success “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a 
conviction or sentence that has not already been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or 
“called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]”  Id. at 
487.   
 In addition, the defendants – the State of Delaware, the Delaware Attorney 
General, and the Presiding Judge of the New Castle County Superior Court – are immune 
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from suit under § 1983 for the reasons given by the District Court.  The Eleventh 
Amendment immunizes States and their agencies from suits for damages in federal court. 
See Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 100-02.  In addition, a judge is absolutely 
immunized from a suit for damages under § 1983 when he acts in a judicial capacity, 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Smith’s claims did not show that the Presiding 
Judge, or any judge involved in his case, for that matter, acted in “the clear absence of all 
jurisdiction,” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978).  Pursuant to Imbler, 424 
U.S. at 420-24, a prosecutor, here the Delaware Attorney General, is immune from suit 
under § 1983 with respect to his decision to prosecute a case and his actions in presenting 
the State’s case at trial. 
 Last, we agree with the District Court that any amendment to the complaint would 
have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(District Court may deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) when amendment is futile).  
Certainly Smith may bring a civil rights action against specific prison officials at the 
prison where he is incarcerated who have been deliberately indifferent to his need for 
psychiatric treatment.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  See also Farmer 
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  Smith’s complaint, however, did not allege that 
any specific prison official had been deliberately indifferent to his need for psychiatric 
treatment.  Moreover, the Eighth Amendment is not violated where a convicted prisoner 
with schizophrenia receives adequate medical and psychiatric care at the prison where he 
is housed.  See Inmates of Allegheny County v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762-63 (3d Cir. 
1979).  See also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983).     
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is 
denied. 
